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THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Akhil Reed Amar*
We live in interesting times, and the times are especially interesting for those of us
who work in the field of constitutional criminal procedure. In a series of essays, I
have sought to explore the foundations of the field-to lay bare, and elaborate
upon, the "first principles" of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. ' These
essays have already begun to provoke heated controversy over some of my specific
doctrinal claims.2 (As I said, we live in interesting times.) In this brief review
essay, I shall try to pull the camera back, highlighting some of the general features
of my "first principles" project. In the process, I hope to say a few words about the
past and present of constitutional criminal procedure, and a few more words about
its future-in courts, in Congress, in classrooms, and in conversations everywhere
in between.
1. WHERE ARE WE, AND How DID WE GET HERE?
A. The Past
As a subfield of constitutional law, constitutional criminal procedure stands as
an anomaly. In many other areas of constitutional law, major Marshall Court
opinions stand out and continue to frame debate both in courts and beyond. In
thinking about judicial review and executive power, we still look to Marbury v.
Madison;3 in pondering the puzzle of jurisdiction-stripping, we go back to Martin
v. Hunter s Lessee;4 in reflecting on the scope of Congress' enumerated powers,
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. J.D., 1984, Yale Law School; B.A., 1980, Yale Universily.
1. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641 (1996); Alchil Reed Amar &
Renee B. LeltoW, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995);
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (£994).
Because my essay today builds so directly on these three articles, I shall not clutter it with repeated citations to
this trilogy. The reader inleresled in more elaboration of any of my claims here about the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments is urged to consult !he relevant article(s) in !he trilogy.
2. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Akhil Amar On Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down
That Wrong Road Again, "74 N.C. L. REv. 1559 (1996); Yale Karnisar, On the "Fruits" ofMiranda Violations,
Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929 (1995); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for
the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. Rev. 820 (1994).
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443, 445-53 (1989).
4. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1499-1505 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neolederalist View ofArticle Ill:
Separating the Two Tiers ofFederal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 205-19 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Article Ill].
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and related issues of federalism, we re-examine McCulloch v. Maryland;5 in
considering vested property rights, we return to Fletcher v. Peck6 and Dartmouth
College v. Woodward;7 and so on. But no comparable Marshall Court landmarks
dot the plain of constitutional criminal procedure.
It is often thought that the explanation for this anomaly lies in another Marshall
.Court landmark, Barron v. Baltimore.s Most criIllinallaw, the argument goes, is
state law; Murder, rape, robbery, and the like are generally not federal crimes.
Under Barron, the constitutional criminal procedure rules of the Bill of Rights did
not apply against states, and so the Marshall Court predictably heard few cases
raising issues of constitutional criminal procedure.
Barron is indeed part of the story, but only part. For the federal government was
very much in the crime-fighting business in the first century of the Bill of Rights.
For constitutional scholars, perhaps the most vivid example of early federal
criminal law comes from the infamous Sedition Act of 1798; but we must also not
forget the territories. Perhaps the most central and sustained project of the federal
government in its first century was the "Americanization" of this continent
through territorial expansion, organization of territorial governments, and eventual
admission to statehood of these territories.9 In the territories, the federal govern-
ment did indeed enforce garden-variety criminal laws against murder, rape,
robbery, and so on. And the Bill of Rights very much applied to these criminal
cases, even under Barron. Territorial law was, constitutionally speaking, federal
law.
But-and this is the key point-for virtually the entire first century of the Bill of
Rights, the United States Supreme Court lacked general appellate jurisdiction over
federal criminal cases. 10 This little-known fact helps explain why, for example, the
Sedition Act prosecutions in the late 1790s-which raised the most important and
far-reaching constitutional issues of their day-never reached the Supreme Court
for ultimate judicial resolution. II
By the time Congress decided to give the High Court general appellate review
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generallyAkhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1451-55, 1512-17 (1987).
6. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1198 n.21 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Bill ofRights] (noting Fletcher states that
Article I § 10 "may be deemed a bill of rights" for each state).
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS Ch. 7 (forthcoming 1997).
8. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). For discussion of Barron, see Amar, Bill ofRights, supra note 6, at 1198-1203.
9. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 483-91 (1991);
Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 942-44,
949-66 (1995).
10. See Amar, Article HI, supra note 4, at 222 & n.63; Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980
Tenn-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts. 95 HARV. L. REv. 17,53 n.105 (1981).
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Reports ofMy Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1651, 1670
(1990).
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over federal criminal cases in 1891, the sun was already setting on the Territorial
Era. Thus, the criminal cases the Supreme Court heard under the new jurisdictional
regime were indeed a skewed lot, with disproportionately more federal customs
violations, tax evasions, and bootleggings than murders, rapes, and robberies. It
was this era, of course, that gave birth to the controversial exclusionary rule.
Then carne the Warren Court, which overruled Barron and began applying the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments directly against states, under the banner of
selective incorporation. With many, many more state criminal cases fueling its
docket, the Warren Court proceeded to build up, in short order, a remarkable
doctrinal edifice of Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment
rules-the foundations of modem constitutional criminal procedure.
But these foundations were none too sure. On a lawyerly level, some of the
Warren Court's most important criminal procedure pronouncements lacked firm
grounding in constitutional text and structure. Key rulings ran counter to early case
law both in lower federal courts and in state courts construing analogous provi-
sions of state constitutions. Precisely because so few Marshall Court cases existed,
this break with Founding-era understandings was less visible. On key issues, the
Warren Court seemed to contradict itself, laying down sweeping rules in some
cases that it could not quite live by in other cases. 12 On a political level, many of
the Warren Court's constitutional criminal procedure pronouncements did not sit
well with the American electorate. The guilty too often seemed to spring free
without good reason-and by this time the guilty regularly included murderers,
rapists, and robbers and not just federal income tax frauds and customs cheats. In a
constitutional democracy, the People, in the long run, usually prevail. Federal
judges may be, at times, "insulated" and "countermajoritarian," but majorities
elect Presidents, and Presidents, with the advice and consent of Senators, pick
federal judges.
And so, with Earl Warren's retirement, and Richard Nixon's election on a "law
and order" platform, the Counter-Revolution began. But the foundations of this
Counter-Revolution are also none too sure. Like the Warren Court, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have at times paid little heed to constitutional text, history, and
structure and have mouthed rules one day only to ignore them the next. 13 If the
Warren Court at times was too easy on the guilty, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
at times have been too hard on the innocent.
B. The Present
Where does all this leave us today? At a crossroads. On at least four different levels, I
submit, the present is a particularly ripe moment for a fundamental rethinking of
constitutional criminal procedure, and for a choice among competing visions.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 15-23.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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Consider first the level of Supreme Court doctrine. At this level, constitutional
criminal procedure is, to put it bluntly, a mess. For more than a quarter of a century,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have busily reshaped Warren Court doctrine in
this field. But often, the Court has chosen to proceed by indirection. Warren Court
landmarks are distinguished away rather than overruled; 14 old cases are hollowed
out from within, but the facade remajns--or does it? And so United States Reports
now swells with language bulging this way and that, at virtually every level of
generality and specificity.
But the problem runs even deeper. For starters, many ofthe.contradictions came
from the Warren Court itself. The Warren Court told us that the Fourth Amendment
requires warrants and probable cause for all searches and seizures. IS But in Terry v.
Ohio,16 Chief Justice Warren himself, writing at the peak of his reign, told us that
frisking is a "search" that does not require warrants or probable cause. 17 Indeed,
Terry quoted the Amendment as simply banning unreasonable searches and
seizures, and declined even to recite the Amendment's language about warrants
and probable cause. IS The Warren Court told us that the Constitution requires
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.19 But in Terry, the Court warned against a
"rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule.,,20 The Warren Court
told us that the exclusionary rule derived from a synergy between the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause.21 But in Schmer-
ber v. California, Justice Brennan-the playmaking guard of Earl Warren's
team-sharply separated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.22 In so doing, Justice
Brennan and the Court clearly held that a man could indeed be obliged to furnish
evidence-his very blood, no less-against himself in a criminal case. And the
logic of that clear holding, as I have explained elsewhere,23 left both the
exclusionary rule and broad theories of self-incrimination exclusion dangling in
midair, with no principled support, constitutionally speaking.
14. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222(1971)(distinguishing but not overruling Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (distinguishing but not overruling United States v.
Wade, 388 U.~. 218 (1967»; United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (distinguishing but not overruling Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961».
IS. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-62 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59
(1967).
16. 392 U.S. I (1968).
17. Id. at 16-20.
18. Id. at 8.
19. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. 392 U.S. at 15.
21. See. e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8-9 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 74 (1964);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646-47,646 n.5, 656-57; id. at 661-66 (Black, J.,
concurring).
22. 384 U.S. 757, 760-65, 766-72 (1966).
23. See generally Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 886-87,892-94,919,927-28; Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A BriefRejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 MICH. L, REv. 1011,
1012 n.5 (1995); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at 788-90.
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So too, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have failed to live up to their
articulated principles. The post-Warren Court has admitted that the exclusionary
rule lacks constitutional footing24 but has kept the rule nonetheless. The Court has
failed to build up alternative remedial schemes that would protect innocent people
from outrageous searches and seizures, and would also deter future government
abuse. In Los Angeles v. Lyons, decided in the heyday of the Burger Court, the
majority simply looked the other way when Los Angeles police officers engaged in
obviously brutal, possibly racist, and at times deadly chokeholds of presumptively
innocent citizens.25 The post-Warren Court has, at times, admitted that warrants
are not the ultimate Fourth Amendment touchstone~ reasonableness is?6 But in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News, the Court worshipped the warrant and blessed the
most constitutionally unreasonable of searches-paper searches of anti-govern-
ment newspapers.27 The Stanford Daily News was not even alleged to have been
engaged in criminal wrongdoing, and yet it, too, got the back of the judicial hand.
When judges either must strain against dominant doctrine to explain easy cases
(like Terry and Schmerber) , or actually get easy cases wrong (like Lyons and
Zurcher), they have obviously taken a wrong tum somewhere. Hence a desperate
need for returning to, and rethinking, first principles.
Consider next the level of Supreme Court personnel. We now stand at a
generational changing of the guard. With the retirements of Justices Brennan,
Marshall and White in the early 1990s, none of those who shared the bench with
Chief Justice Earl Warren now sits. Two-thirds of the current High Court never
even sat with Chief Justice Warren Burger.28 Very few of the current Justices have
much of a personal stake-as an author or dissenter-in the elaborate doctrinal
structures that have been built up and then whittled down in constitutional criminal
procedure. The swing Justices29 today are highly intelligent and relatively nonideo-
logical. They just want to do what is right-and so here again, there is a desperate
need for a clear statement of what are, or should be, the first principles in the field.
Again, precedent alone cannot guide the way-even for those Justices who steer
by precedent as their polestar-because precedent in this field is so regularly
contradictory or perverse.
Now tum to the level of congressional and nationalpolitical conversation. Here
too, we are in the midst, it seems, of a generational changing of the guard. After a
24. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984).
25. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
26. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily News, 436 U.S.
547,559-60 (1978).
27. 436 U.S. at 565.
28. The post-Burger members are, in order of seniority. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
29. Because of the current flux on the Court, almost every one of the Justices stands as a possible swing vote on
at least some current issues of constitutional criminal procedure.
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half-century of Democratic domination, the House now sits in Republican hands.
At first, it might seem implausible that a bare majority of the House and Senate
could radically rewrite criminal procedure policy. Intra-branch filters like the
committee system and the filibuster rule can slow things down and force slim
majorities to yield to strong minorities; and of course, there is always the possible
presidential veto to consider. But even if a mere majority cannot unilaterally
prevail in enacting law, it can often unilaterally define a national agenda-holding
hearings to shine a national spotlight on certain issues while pushing other issues
off the stage. When the Democrats controlled, they did not schedule many hearings
on affirmative action or on the exclusionary rule-wedge issues that might have
splintered the Democratic coalition of minorities, liberal elites, and the working
class. But with Republicans in charge, the exclusionary rule and other issues of
criminal procedure have indeed leaped onto the agenda, and many different
proposals now jostle for attention. 30 Political debate about criminal procedure will
no doubt heat up even more in 1996, with presidential, congressional, and state
campaigns waged in the wake of the ballyhooed "trial of the century" in which
many believe "that a guilty man got away with murder. But which, if any, of the
various proposed reforms now swirling about would actually move America in the
right direction? Yet again, we see the need for an overall framework of analysis
and vision of proper first principles.
Finally, let us consider the level of academic schoLarship. On this level, too, we
stand near a generational changing of the guard in constitutional criminal proce-
dure. Those who in their youth led cheers for the Warren Court are moving
towards, or have already passed into, their retirement years. Dramatic trends are at
work in the academy generally. In constitutional law, textualism and originalism
have staged a come-back; economic analysis has reconfigured many curricular
fields; critical race theory and feminism insistently urge us to ask "the race
question" and "the gender question" everywhere; and so on. How will a new
generation of constitutional criminal procedure scholars reshape the academic
orthodoxies we have inherited?
In a series of "first principles" essays, I have put forth my vision of how
constitutional criminal procedure must be reshaped. In what follows, I shall try to
summarize and explain some of the key elements of this vision.
II. WHERE SHOULD WE Go FROM HERE?
A. ConstitutionaL Methodology
To begin with, we must distinguish constitutional criminal procedure from
criminal procedure generally. Not all sensible rules of criminal procedure can or
30. Examples include "victims' rights" bills. various death penalty proposals. habeas restrictions. "three
strikes" laws, evidence proposals concerning prior bad acts. and jury reform bills (to name just a few).
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should be constitutionalized.31 The Constitution-when read in light of its text,
history, and structure, its doctrinal elaboration in precedent, the need for principled
judicial standards, and so on--simply may not speak to some issues. This is, of
course, one of the reasons we have legislatures-to make sensible policy where the
Constitution permits choice. Legislative solutions can be adjusted in the face of
new facts or changing values far more easily than can rules that have been read into
the Constitution.
Consider, for example, the so-called exclusionary rule. I have attacked this as a
rule of constitutional criminal procedure. This rule is, quite simply, not in our
Constitution. I have not claimed that the Constitution prohibits exclusion, only that
it does not require it. In some times, and in some places, a legislative scheme of
exclusion might be sensible-a two-by-four between the eyes to get the attention
of mulish police. I have emphasized the costs to innocent victims of such exclusion
schemes, but a legislature certainly could decide that the benefits outweigh the
costs for now. If the facts change over time-if, say, police are now generally more
sensitive to Fourth Amendment issues than they were in 1961-a legislature is free
without embarrassment to change the law. A court, however, is not likewise free to
rule one day that the Constitution requires exclusion as a matter of principle, and
then to disregard that very principle the next day.
A critic might object that the Supreme Court has never really said that the
Constitution requires exclusion as a matter of principle but only that exclusion is
one apt remedy to deter. And, the critic might argue, a court is free to fashion
flexible remedies one day and adjust them the next. Such a critic, however, would
be wrong about both Supreme Court case law and constitutional remedial theory.
In about twenty cases, decided over almost a century, the Supreme Court practiced
exclusion in the name of a requirement of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, in tandem with the Fourth Amendment.32 Exclusion was not merely a
31. Here I echo the plea of the great Henry Friendly. See Henry I. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929 (1965).
32. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8-9 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,74 (1964); Ker v.
Califomia, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.s. 643, 646-47, 646 n.5, 655-57 (1961); id. at 661-66
(Black, I., concurring); Feldman v. United States 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452, 466-67 (1932); Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928); id. at 477-78 (Brandeis, I.,
dissenting); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 194
(1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-48
(1925); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57-58 (1924); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313,315-16 (1921);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-76 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,306,311 (1921);
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 395 (1914); Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594, 597-98 (1904); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633-35 (1886). See
generally Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Coun's Construction ofthe Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv.
I, 1-2, 13-16,203-04 (1930) (carefully reading exclusionary case law as based on a Fourth-Fifth fusion theory).
The only major Supreme Court exclusion case that does not invoke the Fifth Amendment is Silvenhome
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The government stressed the Fifth Amendment issue at length.
Under Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906), corporations lacked Self-Incrimination Clause rights, and thus they
could not demand exclusion. See 251 U.S. at 385-90 (argument of the United States). Justice Holmes's three-page
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judicially-fashioned, empirical and deterrence-based remedy for an antecedent
Fourth Amendment violation. It was also, and more importantly, a right under the
Self-Incrimination Clause: Introducing illegally obtained evidence at trial would
itself violate the Fifth Amendment. The paradigm here was a diary wrongfully
seized from a criminal defendant and then read against him at trial: reading the
diarY in court was itself seen as akin to comDellim! a defendant to "witness"J & _
against himself, in violation of self-incrimination principles. Only this argument
from principle explains some of the most basic features of the Supreme Court's
case law. Only this provides the justification for exclusion as a constitutional
mandate. Only this explains why exclusion applies in criminal cases but not civil
cases. Only this explains why illegal arrests are different from illegal searches.
Only this explains so-called "standing" rules.33
But, I have argued, this argument from principle rests on an incorrect reading of
the Constitution.34 Today, the Supreme Court agrees.35 But if so, then exclusion
must fall. The critic's deterrence/remedy gambit fails as a matter of constitutional
law. Once we admit-as the Supreme Court now does36-that a Fourth Amend-
ment violation is complete at the time of the search, and that no new violation
occurs when evidence is admitted at trial, we are admitting that exclusion is not
logically linked to the scope of the violation. Judicial remedies must fit the scope
of the right. For example, a court is not free, as a matter of constitutional law, to
play the "Leavenworth lottery": Because the government violated the constitu-
tional rights of A, judges spin the wheel and spring some lucky (but unrelated)
convict B from Leavenworth. This scheme might indeed deter-and a legislature
might have the power to enact this into law-but courts have no such power as a
matter of traditional remedial theory. And with the Fourth-Fifth fusion argument
having been shattered by Schmerber, Fisher, and Leon/7 exclusion is analytically
indistinguishable from the "Leavenworth lottery."
As these last points suggest, the Constitution is not some ventriloquist's dummy
that can be made to say anything the puppeteer likes. Yet it is remarkable how little
opinion for the Court never carefully addresses this argument, but instead offers us an epigram: Illegal evidence
and its fruits "shall not be used at all." 251 U.S. at 392. But an epigram is not analysis-even when (I would say,
especially when) it comes from Holmes. Analytically, Holmes's statement is simply false. The Government has
always been allowed to use illegally obtained evidence in civil cases, in criminal cases against others, in keeping
contraband, in returning stolen goods to their rightful owners, and so forth. Perhaps Silverthorne's technical
disposition could be upheld nevertheless on the narrow theory that the case, in effect, did not exclude evidence in a
criminal case on the basis of a constitutional mandate but simply quashed a subpoena in a collateral proceeding on
supervisory power grounds.
33. For much more elaboration of these points, see Amar, Founh Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at
790-92.
34. See id. at 785-91; Amar & Lettow, supra note I, at 922-28.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984) (rejecting Fourth-Fifth fusion theory); Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,405-14 (1976) (same).
36. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,905-06 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974).
37. See supra notes 22, 35.
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attentiori many leading scholars and distinguished judges have paid to the text of
the Constitution while busily making criminal procedure pronouncements in its
name. Perhaps this is because so much of the debate, both academic and judicial,
took shape in the early to mid-1960s, when textual argument in constitutional law
often drew smirks from sophisticated lawyers. But most of the major Warren Court
pronouncements did draw, at least in part, on text, and stood on the shoulders of
that giant of constitutional textualism, Justice Hugo Black. Exclusion in Mapp was
required by the words and spirit of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, said Justice
Black in providing the critical fifth vote38-echoing repeated invocations in
Justice Clark's opinion for the Court (at least six, by my count).39 Incorporation of
the Bill of Rights against the states, reminded Justice Black in Duncan, simply
followed the words and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, including
its Privileges or Immunities Clause.4o Warrants and probable cause, said the
Warren Court, were required because the text of Fourth Amendment implicitly said
so; its words made no sense otherwise.41 Florida could not try Gideon without a
lawyer, Justice Black wrote for the Court, because the Sixth Amendment's words
provided for a "right of counsel" and the Fourteenth Amendment's words
incorporated fundamental rights against states.42 Miranda must go free, said the
Court, because he was in effect compelled to be a witness against himself in a
criminal case in violation of the words and spirit of the Fifth Amendment.43 And so
on.
What's more, sophisticated constitutional lawyers today no longer scoff at
textual argument. Unlike Coach Lombardi on winning, we do not consider text
"the only thing," but we do think it is relevant-it is something-that the Fourth
Amendment's text fails to require warrants and probable cause for all searches and
seizures; and that this failure makes lots of sense. Surely it is relevant that the
Fourth Amendment says nothing about exclusion, and that if it did, it surely does
not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. Surely it is relevant that the
Fourth Amendment's words about the people's right to be secure in "their persons,
houses, papers and effects" conjure up tort law, which does protect these interests.
Surely it is relevant that when Colonel Oliver North is forced to testify before
Congress and his words are never admitted against him in his criminal trial, but
38. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 646-47. 646 n.5, 655-57 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Baydthat Fourth and Fifth Amendments ron
"almost into each other"; noting "close connection between the concepts later embodied in these two
Amendments"; stressing "conceptual nexus" between Fourth Amendment and roles against coerced confessions;
suggesting that Constitution gives an "accused" a "privilege" against being "forced to give" "evidence";
suggesting that unreasonable seizures are "tantamount" to "coerced testimony"; and insisting that "the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments" enjoy an "intimate relation").
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-67 & n.1 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
41. See, e.g., Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-62 (1969); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
613-15 (1961).
42. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,339-40.341 (1963).
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 442,457-62,467 (1966).
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testimonial fruits do come in, Colonel North has never been compelled to be a
witness against himself in a criminal case. Surely it is relevant that the Sixth
Amendment speaks only to rights of the "accused." Surely it is relevant that, if I
testify about what my mom told me one day, my mom is not in any ordinary-
language sense a "witness" within the wording of the Confrontation Clause.
Surely it is relevant that in other clauses featuring the word "witness"-such as
the Treason Clause44-the Constitution uses the word in its plain-meaning sense.
Textual argument is, as I have said, a proper starting point for proper constitu-
tional analysis. Sometimes, plain-meaning textual arguments in the end must yield
to the weight of other proper constitutional arguments-from history, structure,
precedent, practicality, and so on.45 And so the astonishing thing is not that
someone might find the above-catalogued textual points to be outweighed at times
by other arguments. Rather, the astonishing thing is that these textual points are
almost never made, or even seen. This is true even when the text, carefully read,
explains most or all of the leading cases in a given area, or when the text resonates
with obvious common sense. In virtually every other area of constitutional law,
such a state of affairs is unimaginable. I think it cannot last much longer in the area
of constitutional criminal procedure. The field may have evolved as an insular
ecosystem unto itself, but global changes in constitutional law discourse must soon
affect the atmosphere here, too.
Similar points can be made about constitutional history and structure. English
common-law antecedents of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as well as
early state and federal cases, certainly belong in a proper conversation about
constitutional criminal procedure. The fact that English courts have never ex-
cluded evidence on Fourth-Amendment-like grounds, and that no American court,
state or federal, ever did so during the first century after Independence surely
deserves some mention.46 So too with the fact that England has never excluded
"fruits" of immunized testimony or coerced confessions,47 and the fact that the
English rule reigned as the dominant one in Congress and in American courts prior
to the Supreme Court's 1892 Counselman48 case for testimonial immunity,49 and
until the 1960s for coerced confessions.50 Similarly, it must matter that early courts
never claimed that the "only" remedy for speedy trial violations was dismissal
with prejudice.
44. u.s. CONST. art. III, § 3 (generally requiring "two witnesses to the same overt Act" for treason).
45. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987). For other powerful and illuminating accounts of interpretive methodology in
constitutional law, see PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILL.IP BOBBIT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FATE (1982); Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119 (1995).
46. See Amar, FounhAmendmenr First Principles, supra note I, at 786-87, 789 n.123.
47. See Amar & Lettow, supra note I, at 916-19.
48. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
49. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 911-16.
50. See id. at 917 n.265.
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Structurally, we must pay close attention to how different parts of our Constitu-
tion fit together, textually and practically. Textually: Shouldn't "reasonableness"
under the Fourth Amendment be read in light of other constitutional values--of
property, privacy, equality, due process, free speech, democratic participation, and
the like-affirmed in other amendments? Shouldn't Seventh Amendment juries
play some role in determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness, just as they play
a role in determining reasonableness generally in tort law? Why should preclusive
ex parte warrants be worshipped in the Fourth Amendment when they so obviously
present genuine Fifth Amendment due process problems of notice and opportunity
to be heard? Wouldn't it be nice if the word "witness" could have the same
meaning in the Treason Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Confrontation
Clause, and the Compulsory Process Clause? Practically: Hasn't an overbroad
reading of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause betrayed the accused's
explicit Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses in his favor?51 Hasn't that
overbroad reading also obstructed the defendant's explicit Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial?52 Thus, hasn't our Fifth Amendment doctrine ended up helping
guilty defendants while hurting innocent ones?
As these last points make clear, proper methodology of constitutional criminal
procedure does not blind itself to practical effects. Indeed, though my "first
principles" essays have always sought to respect text, history, and structure, they
have also sought to make good common sense, motivated by the simple idea that
constitutional criminal procedure should protect the innocent, and not needlessly
advantage the guilty.
B. The Substance ofProcess
This commonsensical point, I submit, is the essence of our Constitution's rules
about criminal procedure and so I shall repeat it: The Constitution seeks to protect
the innocent. The guilty, in general, receive procedural protection only as an
incidental and unavoidable byproduct of protecting the innocent because of their
innocence. Law breaking, as such, is entitled to no legitimate expectation of
privacy, and so if a search can detect only law breaking as such, it poses little threat
to Fourth Amendment values.53 By the same token, the exclusionary rule is wrong,
51. Because current Fifth Amendment immunity is so broad, the government enjoys the right to immunize any
witness, but defendants do not. (Otherwise a defendant could give all his partners in crime a powerful immunity
bath.) With a narrower immunity rule in place, defendants could play on a level immunity field with the
government, as required by the Sixth Amendment. For much more explanation, see Amar & Lettow, supra note I,
at 861-64, 901-903; Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at 699-702.
52. Currently, government may often delay A's trial until it can convict his partner in crime B, who can then be
obliged to testify against A without the usual high cost of Kastigar immunity. A narrower Fifth Amendment
immunity rule would solve this problem, as I explain inAmar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at
702.
53. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 & no. 22-23 (1984); Arnold H. Loewy, The Founh
Amendment as a Devicefor Protecting the innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 907 (1983).
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as a constitutional rule, precisely because it creates huge windfalls for guilty
defendants but gives no direct remedy to the innocent woman wrongly searched.
The guiltier you are, the more evidence the police find, the bigger the exclusionary
rule windfall; but if the police know you are innocent, and just want to hassle you
(because of your race, or politics, or whatever) the exclusionary rule offers exactly
zero compensation or deterrence.54
Truth and accuracy are vital values. A procedural system that cannot sort the
innocent from the guilty will confound any set of substantive laws, however just.
And so to throw out highly reliable evidence that can indeed help us separate the
innocent from the guilty-and to throw it out by pointing to the Constitution, no
less-is constitutional madness. A Constitution proclaimed in the name of We the
People should be rooted in enduring values that Americans can recognize as our
values. Truth and the protection of innocence are such values. Virtually everything
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, properly read, promotes, or at least
does not betray, these values.
If anyone believes that other nice-sounding, but far less intuitive, ideas are also
in the Constitution, the burden of proof should be on him. Here are two examples:
(1) "The Constitution requires that government must never profit from its own
wrong. Hence, illegally obtained evidence must be excluded." (2) "No man should
be compelled to be an instrument of his own destruction. Hence, reliable physical
fruits of immunized testimony should be excluded." These sound nice, but where
does the Constitution say that? And are we truly willing to live by these as
constitutional rules? The first would require that the government return stolen
goods to thieves, and illegal drugs to drug-dealers. But this has never been the law.
The second would prevent coerced fingerprinting and DNA sampling. This, too, is
almost impossible to imagine in practice.55 By contrast, the innocence-protection
rock on which I stand, and the specific Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
derivations therefrom, are things that we can all live by, without cheating.
54. This is, of course, a point stressed by none other than Chief Justice Warren in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
14-15 & n.ll (1968).
55. My analysis here calls into question the rule of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as a
constitutional mandate. To forcibly pump a person's stomach against his will and without sufficient justification is
horribly wrong-an obvious Fourth Amendment violation-but the violation occurs when the stomach is
pumped, not at some later point. Thus, the pumping is wrong regardless of whether the forced vomit is ultimately
found to contain illegal drugs, whether the drugs are ever introduced as evidence, whether the evidence is
introduced in a criminal (as opposed to civil) case, or whether a case is brought against the pumpee (as opposed to,
say, a third-party drug pusher). Introduction of reliable evidence-like drugs-is not itselfan independent wrong,
and exclusion of such evidence does not properly remedy the antecedent wrong of pumping: exclusion provides
an upside-down aid to the guilty, and no remedy to the innocent whose vomit is drug-free. Consider also the
possible "causation gap" created by exclusion: a timely and perfectly lawful Schmerber-like blood test might
have generated comparable evidence of drug ingestion, and so,exclusion may confer a kind of windfall on a guilty
pumpee.
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My vision of constitutional criminal procedure borrows from and builds on
insights elaborated in other scholarly fields. Consider, for example, how much we
constitutional criminal proceduralists can learn from what might at first seem a
most unlikely source: tax scholarship. In developing a now-classic framework of
analysis, Professor Stanley Surrey brought into view the "upside-down" effect of
certain tax subsidies: By subsidizing certain private activity via tax deductions
rather than direct governmental outlays, the federal government effectively gave
greater subsidies to high-bracket taxpayers than to low-bracket taxpayers. In light
of the purposes underlying some subsidies, argued Professor Surrey, this distribu-
tional pattern of benefits was perverse-"upside down" in Professor Surrey's
famous phrase.56
Professor Surrey understood that both direct expenditures and tax deductions
could subsidize and create incentives, but with very different distributional
consequences. A similar focus on distribution helps explain one of the many ways
in which the exclusionary rule is so perverse-upside down, if you will. Both tort
law and evidentiary exclusion seek to create incentives-both seek to deter
misconduct-but with very different distributional patterns. Under proper tort law,
the guilty man never recovers more simply because he is guilty;57 but the
exclusionary rule rewards the guilty man, and only the guilty man, precisely
because he is guilty. This is the "bite" of the rule, the lever by which it moves the
police to repent and reform. Under the Self-Incrimination Clause, fruits-immunity
similarly rewards the guilty without helping the innocent. Indeed, it rewards the
guilty in ways that hurt the innocent. Constitutional criminal procedure must
cleanse itself of these and other similarly perverse "upside down" rules.
It is often claimed that the exclusionary rule and fruits-immunity never truly
"reward" the guilty. Had the government not searched illegally or compelled the
testimony, the argument goes, the government would not have the fruit, and so
exclusion of the fruit never creates a windfall for guilty defendants, but only
56. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATIfWAYS To TAX REFORM: THE CONQ'PT OF TAX EXPENDITURES
(1973); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures with Direct Government Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives
as a Device for ImpLementing Governmental Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970).
Although Professor Surrey's specific approach is controversial in tax circles, no serious tax scholar can avoid
thinking about, and confronting head-on, Professor Surrey's argument about "upside-down" effects. Yet many
major scholars in constitutional criminal procedure seem to have spent their entire careers without ever seriously
confronting the upside-down effect of various exclusionary rules.
57. See Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 1, at 795-96 & n.139 (providing analysis and
citations); see aLso DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 143 (2d ed. 1994);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants
as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 270 (1988).
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restores the status quo ante.58 But this glib argument ignores what I have called the
"causation gap," encompassing all the possible ways in which the fruit might very
well have come to light anyway. Courts have given too little rein to anti-
exclusionary doctrines such as inevitable discovery; and where eventual fruits
discovery is only probable, or possible, rather than inevitable, permanent exclu-
sion creates huge windfalls for many guilty defendants.
With issues of incentives, deterrence, distribution of reward, and causation so
obviously important, it should be plain that criminal procedure scholars can also
learn important lessons from tort law scholarship. The text of the Fourth Amend-
ment presupposes tort law, and the Founders repeatedly invoked the idea of
punitive damages to "deter"-their word59-unreasonable searches and seizures.
Originalism and functionalism converge here, for the Founders understood deter-
rence far better than many sophisticated modem-day scholars. Consider, for
example, the following passage from Professor Stuntz in favor of the exclusionary
rule:
Thus, the difficulty with [tort] damages boils down to this: no one knows how
to value damages for illegal searches with any accuracy ... Overdeterrence is a
special concern ... Underdeterrence, however, is also a serious problem ....60
Now, Bill Stuntz is a friend of mine-and there is no one in the field whose work
I respect more-but there are so many things wrong with his functionalist defense
of the exclusionary rule that it is hard to know where to start. Here, and elsewhere,
Professor Stuntz acts as if the choice is tort law or exclusion-but nobody (and
surely not Professor Stuntz) really thinks so. No one proposes that tort and tort-like
remedies be abolished. To do so would be insane-like declaring open season on
those whom the cops know to be innocent, but do not like, and want to hassle.
Exclusion alone could never be sufficient.
But if so, the wrinkles of tort law must be ironed out regardless of whether we
keep or scrap exclusion. For the Webster Bivenses of the world-innocent citizens
hassled by government-it will always be "damages or nothing" 61 and courts will
need to fashion sensible rules about damage remedies here just as they do
everywhere else in tort law. And if at the end of the day there is, as Professor Stuntz
believes, a real risk of overdeterrence, how does that argue for adding-not, I
repeat, substituting-whatever additional deterrence comes from exclusion?
But Professor Stuntz's problems are only beginning. Suppose that we really did
have to choose between tort law and exclusion. Tort law risks overdeterrence and
58. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor
Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 568-69 (1990); Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1,36 n.151, 47-48 (1987).
59. See Amar, FOllrthAmendment First Prindples, supra note 1, at 776 & n.71, 777 & n.75, 798 & n.146.
60. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881. 905 (1991).
61. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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underdeterrence-but so does the exclusionary rule! (So does any solution.) The
underdeterrence of exclusion is obvious. For starters, it has no bite-no bark,
even-when cops want to hassle someone they know to be innocent, from whom
they expect to find no evidence. But even when police expect to and do find
evidence, the exclusionary rule underdeters by allowing government to get the
drugs off the street or return the stolen goods to their rightful owner, to use the
evidence in a civil suit against the searchee, or to use the evidence in a criminal suit
against anyone else. Exclusion also can greatly overdeter, as we have seen, by
preventing government from ever using critical evidence (or its fruit) against the
searchee, even though that evidence (or its fruit) might otherwise have come to
light.
Perhaps Professor Stuntz thinks that the exclusionary rule's unavoidable overde-
terrence and underdeterrence will somehow cancel each other out, leaving us with
something that Goldilocks would call "just right." But like the story of the three
bears, this is pure fantasy. Tort law, by contrast, is logical and realistic-tort law
remedies can be squarely tailored to fit the tortious wrong of unreasonable search
and seizure. Unlike exclusion, tort law is thus not inherently mismatched, and is far
more likely to reach the right amount of overall deterrence. Punitive-damage
multipliers can always be cranked up or down to achieve a given overall level of
deterrence; whereas exclusion cannot be adjusted at the margins without raising
serious "Leavenworth lottery" issues.
Let us now summarize, on purely functional grounds, the contrast between tort
law and exclusion. The upside-down exclusionary rule skews benefits towards the
guilty; tort law is "right-side up." The precise amount of deterrence from
exclusion turns on a whole range of accidental contingencies: whether a search
seeks evidence as such, whether a search uncovers evidence, whether that
evidence may be used in other ways (civilly, o~ against other criminal defendants),
whether other evidence will suffice to convict the target, and whether the
unavoidable causation gap will be big or small. Tort law, by contrast, focuses on
the invasion of the search itself-its intrusiveness, its outrageousness, its violence,
etc. Put a different way, exclusion is simply not linked, analytically speaking, to
the scope of the violation, which occurs before a criminal trial, not during it. Tort
law focuses precisely on the scope of the violation. Professor Stuntz thinks that
Fourth Amendment doctrine should focus more on police violence.62 I agree-but
the exclusionary rule simply does not work here; whether the cops punched me in
the nose is almost never analytically--or even causally-linked to whether they
found evidence in my house.63 Exclusion would thus achieve the right amount of
62. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016,
1060-77 (1995).
63. Professor Stuntz seems to recognize this problem, see id. at 1072, but then breezes by it in a way that would
make "Leilvenworth lottery" fans cheer, and traditional remedies scholars wince. His approach has also been
squarely rejected in case law, see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 471
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overall deterrence only by the wildest of coincidences, like the broken watch that
tells the correct time twice a day. Finally, tort law payment comes from the
wrongdoing government, whereas the visible sight of grinning criminals freed by
exclusion localizes savage "demoralization costs" on identifiable crime victims.
This last phrase, of course, comes from Professor Miche1man's classic analysis of
the Just Compensation Clause,64 a clause that, as I have shown, resembles the
Fourth Amendment in some ways.65
The "demoralization costs" concept reminds us that beyond tort law, narrowly
defined, lies the broad field of law and economics generally. Here too, constitu-
tional criminal proceduralists have much to learn. Perhaps the biggest lesson is the
importance of ex ante incentive effects.66 Overprotection of some rights may
trigger strategic reactions that will lead to predictable underprotections elsewhere.
The exclusionary rule tempts judges to deny that Fourth Amendment violations
occurred; something similar occurs under the draconian rule requiring dismissals
with prejudice for all Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause violations. If all
searches really do require warrants and probable cause, judges will strain to deny
that some intrusions really are "searches." If we prevent the government from
freezing a suspect's story in place early on in a civilized deposition, we .may drive
interrogation underground into far more potentially abusive fora; we will also
encourage surprise searches, sting operations, and other serious intrusions. Pre-
cisely because courts overprotect the guilty by excluding testimonial fruit, they
undermine other defendants' explicit right to compel incriminating testimony from
third-party witnesses-a right of surpassing importance to innocent defendants.
More generally, if doctrine creates an overly intricate matrix of trial rights, the
government may react by trying to hold fewer trials, thereby forcing defendants
into harsher plea bargains. In general, plea bargaining may tend to punish guilty
and inl).ocent alike--or to advantage those with powerful lawyers-rather than to
sift the innocent from the guilty. For many innocent defendants, less may be more:
(1985). Cf. id. at 475-76 (dissenting opinion by Brennan and Marshall arguing for Stuntz-like approach while
conceding that the Coun's contrary approach was "following precedent"). A bit later in his discussion, see 93
MICH. L. REv. at 1074 n.2\O, Professor Stuntz again seems to miss the obvious ways that exclusion can overdeter
because of causation gaps-gaps his approach two pages earlier would of course dramatically widen. And he
continues to reveal real confusion about how damage remedies fit into his world, compare id. at 1072 n.201 with
id. at 1073 & n.203. Some of this confusion may stem from an uncharacteristic inattention to the Coase Theorem.
Cf Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at 812-13.
64. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214 (1967).
65. On the similarities, see Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 1, at 790 n.126, 807-08, 809
n.188. On the differences, see Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note I, at 54.
66. See generally Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-12 (1984). Among constitutional criminal proceduralists, Professor
Stuntz has been a leading practitioner of ex ante incentive analysis in a wide range of intriguing and illuminating
articles. See, e.g., Roben E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargains as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992);
William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv. 1903 (1993); William J. Stuntz,
Implied Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1992).
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less trial procedure may mean more trials, and thus more chance to prove their
innocence.
Just as "less" can sometimes be "more," "different" can at times be the
"same": Some of the Founders' basic vision must be "translated" into our legal
culture.67 Entity liability is one example; since the locus of government decision-
making has shifted over two hundred years from the individual constable to the
police department, so should the locus of de jure liability for constitutional torts.
By contrast, various exclusionary rules are bad "translations" because they
impose "upside-down" effects that were anathema to the framing generation, and
are hateful to the general citizenry even today.
Administrative law is in some ways a modem-day translation of tort law-with
workers' compensation boards and OSHA rules displacing common-law negli-
gence suits. Similar translations may make sense in constitutional criminal
procedure. Administrative compensation schemes with "right-side up" recovery
patterns may sensibly supplement, and perhaps in places supplant, individual (and
more cumbersome) tort suits. Citizen review panels within police departments can
serve functions akin to common-law style juries. Speedy trial framework statutes
can regularize pretrial process. The list could go on. Because some of those
schemes are distinctly subconstitutional, whereas I have emphasized constitutional
criminal procedure, I have perhaps devoted less attention to administrative
schemes than they deserve. But my relative de-emphasis must not be mistaken for
hostility.
If constitutional criminal procedure must attend to constitutional law, it also
must attend to criminal law and procedural law. Criminal procedure must work to
vindicate rather than undermine sensible norms of substantive criminal law. At one
specific level, my framework links up the criminal procedural rule against
compelled self-incrimination based on a fear of false confession, and the sensible
substantive criminal law doctrine of corpus delicti. At a more general level, my
procedural vision seeks to vindicate substantive norms by emphasizing accuracy
and truth-finding in adjudication. Process should be arranged to separate those who
did violate the substantive law from those who did not. If some substantive
criminal laws-drug laws, perhaps-are bad policy, then let us change them
directly rather than trying to offset or neuter them with procedural gimmicks that
will also obstruct our efforts to enforce uncontroversially sensible criminal laws,
like laws against murder, rape, and robbery. At times, however, some procedural
rules will have a differential impact on different crimes.68 For example, a rule
excluding compelled testimony but admitting compelled fruit casts a happy
substantive shadow: It will help political and religious dissenters without giving
much aid and comfort to murderers. Blasphemy and libel tend not to generate
67. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165 (1993).
68. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393
(1995).
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physical fruit, but murder results in dead bodies, bloody knives, and the like.
Criminal proceduralists must carefully attend to the ways that procedure can affect
substantive enforcement policy for good or for ill. At the most general level, things
do not "cancel out" if we exclude half the evidence, catch half the truly bad guys,
and then simply double the punishment for those unlucky enough to get caught.
The social norms underlying sensible substantive laws are best reinforced with
high detection, and quick (though not necessarily severe) punishment. "War on
crime" rhetoric needs to be channelled away from savage penal policies, towards
strategies that lead to high detection and quick, reliable adjudication.
Laws against murder, rape, and robbery remind us of the importance of victims.
Feminist theory is especially important here, given that women are more likely to
be victims than to be criminal defendants.69 And in asking the "race question" we
must also remember that racial minorities are often the victims of crime, too. In
thinking about feminism and critical race theory more generally, we should also
ask about the race and gender of those doing the searching, seizing, questioning,
and adjudicating: police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. All of these issues, I
submit, are central to the idea of a truly constitutional criminal procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
Will judges, scholars, lawmakers, and citizens hearken to my call for a
reconceptualization of the field? It is far too early to tell, but by nature I am an
optimist. Some will no doubt oppose my vision-but others, I hope, will rally to
the banner I have tried to raise. Debate will be vigorous-perhaps even heated-
but vigorous debate is healthy in a vibrant democracy. As I said, we live in
interesting times.
69. In a recent essay, Professor Schulhofer seems to tiptoe up to, but not quite admit, the many and profound
ways that feminism may call into question the generally pro-defendant stance of now-orthodox criminal
procedure scholarship (including Schulhofer's own oeuvre). See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge
in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (1995).
